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Plenary Session

Taking the “Pest” Out of Pest Control: Humaneness and Wildlife Damage Management
JOHN HADIDIAN, Director Urban Wildlife Programs, The Humane Society of the United States, Washington D.C.,
USA
ABSTRACT Humans have been in the pest control business for a long time. At least 3 major foci of pest control activity
currently can be found in governmental and private sectors, with private services focused on both traditional commensal
rodent work as well as the more recent control of “nuisance” wildlife in cities and towns. Beyond the traditional approaches
and techniques historically employed, animal damage managers are increasingly faced with the challenge of addressing the
social context within which their work occurs. An ever-increasing variety of stakeholders have brought new concerns, new
thinking, and new approaches to the table in a field that formerly received little if any, public input. A significant, perhaps
the most significant, challenge for wildlife damage managers in the future is how to better engage their programs in the
pluralistic and often confrontational environments of contemporary wildlife damage management.
KEY WORDS “pest,” pest control, humaneness, wildlife damage management, ethics.

If the grooming behavior found almost universally
among primates functions at least in part to remove
ectoparasites, we can confidently say that humans
were engaging in pest control even before we became
human. Once we domesticated plants and animals and
were raising our own food, the matter of controlling
pests assumed economic importance and became amenable to a business model. The first pest control businessmen in the West were probably the rat-catchers of
the Middle Ages, whose profession grew out of the rise
of urban centers, lack of sanitation, and the outbreak
of the plagues that led to the origin of the word “pest”
itself (Oxford English Dictionary 1971). Rat-catching was imported from European to American urban
centers around 1840, and by the 1920s was well
enough established to have spawned state and national
associations (Snetsinger 1983). By then, the control of
the injurious insects provided even bigger markets than
injurious rodents. Traditional pest control businesses
retain an emphasis on the control of invertebrates to
this day. Agriculturalists were battling pests early on as
well, and federal assistance came to them during the
1890s in the form of an Office of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy founded by C. Hart Merriam.
The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 established university
agricultural extension services to augment some of
these services (San Julian 2012), and with the 1931
passage of the Animal Damage Control Act, the government’s role in vertebrate pest control was further
codified. Decades later, beginning around the 1970s,
changing conditions in the cities and suburbs created
an opportunity for the rise of small private businesses
specializing in nuisance wildlife control (Braband and
Clark 1987). These businesses were aimed at wildlife

species such as squirrels and raccoons that had not previously been the focus of professional control services.
At about the same time the nuisance wildlife control
industry was taking shape, environmental awareness
was rising out of a growing body of knowledge pointing to the dangers associated with the chemical control
of pests. This complemented and may have stimulated
contemporaneous social activism focused on the treatment of animals, leading to the rise of what can be
called the modern “animal movement” (Nash 1989).
Environmentalism, ecological thinking, animal rights,
conservation biology, urban wildlife, and nuisance
wildlife control all recently and in a sense suddenly
have become relevant to the dialogue about pest
control. That dialogue has often involved more
polemic than discussion. My objective here will be to
address where, and perhaps how, further discussion
might take place.
THE “ANIMAL MOVEMENT”: WHAT IS IT
ABOUT?
The animal movement that grew of the activism of the
1970s, but which also has a significant history before
that, comprises 3 main streams of thought and action:
animal rights, animal welfare, and animal protection.
Animal rights in its contemporary form largely took
shape around the philosophies introduced by Peter
Singer (1975) and Tom Regan (1983). Singer and
Regan articulate quite different ideas about the duties we owe animals, belying the popular assumption
that this field stands as a monolithic block of thought;
still, the term “animal rights” is what one hears most
often used in reference to any form of activism over
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the treatment of animals, especially in the press. Animal welfare typically describes a movement that first
took form in the mid-nineteenth century, largely over
concern for the treatment of domestic animals,
particularly pets and draft animals, which led to the
founding of local humane societies and animal control
agencies (Niven 1967). A broad generalization about
animal welfare would be that it is concerned more with
how animals are treated than why. Animal protection,
to this writer, is a field in which some of the concerns
of both animal rights and welfare join with certain
aspects of environmentalism, especially those dealing
with the status and welfare of natural communities.
When considering a program to reduce a population
of prairie dogs, an animal protectionist would ask not
only how the animals would be killed but also why the
killing was justified in the first place.

feels is right or appropriate for a given issue can, and
perhaps inevitably has to, be wrapped up in his or her
identity. The facts (data) can be laid out on the table,
but the table itself (feelings) is very much a part of the
room.
It is also important that those involved in the dialogue about wildlife damage management, either
as practitioner or critic, own a piece of the concept
of “humaneness.” Both the term and the concept of
humaneness have to come into much more common use and those who use or appeal to either have
to be clear about what it is they are saying. For example, consider the almost casual way in which many
who advocate for humane treatment embrace the
“humane” trap—the box or cage-like device that often
is employed in wildlife control to capture and hold
animals alive. It may be right to argue that cage traps
are less likely to cause harm than other restraining
devices, such as snares or foothold traps, but it is still
important to recognize that they can. Abrasions and
lacerations are something anyone who uses cage traps
has encountered, particularly in excitable species or
individuals, and broken teeth are not uncommon. A
broken canine can lead to prolonged suffering or even
a potentially life-threatening problem that will not
be manifested until long after release. Human error,
ignorance, or apathy also can lead to a painful death
when trapped animals are left unattended in extreme
heat or cold. Perhaps it would be better not to call any
restraining devices “humane” and turn attention instead to appropriate frameworks within which their
use, or misuse, could be better defined.

Activism springs directly from all of the arms of the
animal movement and ranges broadly across a spectrum of social activities encompassing everything from
violence to civil disobedience to democratically legislated initiatives. That animal activism and vertebrate
pest control would provide a fertile ground for direct
confrontation, and that activism would be perceived as
an important threat to wildlife managers, is a bit of a
foregone conclusion (e.g., Brooks 1988). Differences,
some big and some small, always will exist between the
two, making it less relevant that they be resolved than
understood. How to arrive at a better understanding
of the varied opinions and positions taken in the highly plural environments surrounding wildlife damage
management perhaps is the most significant challenge
in contemporary wildlife damage management.

DO WE NEED ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS?
The concept of ethical frameworks can be used to
visualize how we ought to act toward wild animals
(Fraser 1999, Hadidian et al. 2006). Ethical frameworks are widely used as guides in everything from
medical practices to tow truck operations. They are
useful in directing the way we think, or should think,
about issues, even when we know we cannot—or will
not—act accordingly. Ethical frameworks are applicable to all aspects of animal welfare and pest control (Littin and Mellor 2005, Warburton and Norton
2007) including areas where we might think ethics
not to be a consideration at all. For example, consider
the relationships we have with insects and commensal rodents, two common types of pests. A reasonable argument could be made that we owe no duty or

SOME GENERAL PREMISES
Given that any dialogue about the control of vertebrate pests will likely include strongly held and often
diametrically opposing points of view, it might be
helpful to look for common ground and shared concepts before considering ways to deal with disagreements. Recent studies of human-wildlife conflict emphasize what those who specialize in this area have
known more intuitively for some time—that it is often
human-human more than human-wildlife conflicts
that managers must face (Madden 2004). People
construct their view of conflicts based on individual
and group-shaped assumptions, perspectives, and values (Goedeke and Herda-Rapp 2005). What anyone
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obligations to either. Both invade our homes, expose
us to disease, spoil our food, and compete for our
crops, among other insults and injuries. Why should
we worry about how we treat either?

statistical confidence, uncontrolled environmental settings, and state-of-art traps. Metrics such as these can
be used to create assessments of welfare states.
Sharp and Saunders (2011) provided a robust model of welfare assessment. Recognizing that both
nonlethal and lethal methods can affect welfare, they
employed the concept of domains as recognized by the
United Kingdom Farm Animal Welfare Council to
identify five areas in which an animal’s welfare can be
compromised: water and food deprivation; environmental challenge; pain, injury, and disease; behavioral
restriction; and anxiety, fear, and distress. Then they
created an assessment matrix that scales the severity
of the harm as a function of its duration, to identify
the overall consequence of an intervention. Additionally, for killing methods, the level of suffering before
insensibility occurs can be mapped against the duration of the event to measure welfare consequences.
The resulting matrices can be used to organize thinking about severity in situations that compromise an
animal’s welfare.

Arguably, we have obligations toward both, even
if they are minimal. If we concede that insects and
rodents are sentient, that is, capable of experiencing
feelings such as pain, then we at least should hold a
duty toward them not to cause harm when they are
not, or only trivially are, causing us harm or harming things we value (Lockwood 1987). With insects,
such thinking opens a moral umbrella over the many
tens of thousands of species whose presence does no
offense to humans, may yet be found critical to the
functioning of healthy ecosystems, and for whom extinction would be irrecoverable. With rodents, given
our long and adverse relationship, the idea of minimal
harm perhaps is more applicable to how we kill them
than why we need to kill. If, as has been convincingly
shown, we can identify ways to kill rodents that are
far less humane than others (Mason and Littin 2003),
then we can argue that the least inhumane of these
ought to be given priority consideration when control
is going to occur, as a duty and obligation to avoid
causing unnecessary suffering.

In theory at least, such approaches can provide
objective comparisons of the welfare consequences
of different techniques commonly used in wildlife
damage management. Obviously, a raccoon caught
in a cage trap and removed an hour after capture
suffers significantly less than one caught and held for
an entire day, and the assessment matrix easily accounts
for this. But did a raccoon caught in a body-gripping
trap that rendered her insensible in six minutes and
dead in fifteen suffer less than a raccoon left in a cage
trap for too many hours, who then died of hypothermia? Ideally, welfare matrix assessments will be able
to address such questions and go a long way toward
creating more focused and productive dialogues, if not
consensus, about the welfare consequences of management actions. One thing such assessments will not do,
however, is fully address such questions as whether
management is justified and objectives achievable in
the first place.

MEASURING HUMANENESS
Humans intervene in the lives of wild animals for many
reasons to create both positive and negative welfare
consequences (Kirkwood and Sainsbury 1996). These
interventions may be indirect, as in the case of humancaused habitat loss, or direct, as in the case of trapping
and killing animals deemed to be pests. Whatever the
case, interventions can be conceptualized using ethical
frameworks to identify practical procedures that will
ground interventions in more concrete and measurable understanding of the extent to which animals will
suffer, as well as die unnecessarily.
Criteria for the measurement of suffering are fairly well
established. Kirkwood et al. (1994), for example, identified several factors associated with welfare measures,
including: the number of animals affected, the cause
and nature of the harm, the duration of the harm,
and the capacity of the animal to suffer. Proulx (1999)
applies welfare standards to the technology used to
lethally trap or restrain wild animals and introduces a
set of factors that includes: time to death, efficiency,

MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES
Addressing these and other concerns about why programs are implemented has been a longstanding concern of wildlife managers (e.g., McCabe and Kocizky
1972), but a general set of management principles
has only recently been derived (e.g. Fisher and Marks
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1996, Marks 1999, Littin et al. 2004). The following
can initially be identified as required steps in management of human-wildlife conflicts:

apply the term consistently to all species—the deer,
beaver, geese, elephants, gorillas, and, yes, humans—
with whom conflicts arise that must be resolved,
then it might be advisable to find alternative ways of
describing matters. If we are to retain the term, then
we ought to freely admit that any species can be
referred to as a “pest,” and remember to include ourselves, since it may well be that humans are the greatest pest species of them all.

• Need to act must be clear (justification),
• Benefits sought must be realistic (achievability),
• Methods to be employed must be able to achieve
benefits (effectiveness),
• Approach must be targeted to the problem-causing
individuals (specificity),
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